Design and Performance Analysis of Secure Multicasting Cooperative
  Protocol for Wireless Sensor Network Applications by Atallah, Michael & Kaddoum, Georges
iDesign and Performance Analysis of Secure
Multicasting Cooperative Protocol for Wireless
Sensor Network Applications
Michael Atallah, and Georges Kaddoum, Member, IEEE.
Abstract—This paper proposes a new security cooperative
protocol, for dual phase amplify-and-forward large wireless
sensor networks. In such a network, a portion of the K relays can
be potential eavesdroppers. The source agrees to share with the
destination a given channel state information (CSI) of a source-
trusted relay-destination link to encode the message. Then, in the
first hop, the source will use this CSI to map the right message
to a certain sector while transmitting fake messages to the other
sectors using sectoral transmission thanks to analog beamform-
ing. In the second hop, the relays retransmit their received signals
to the destination, using the distributed beamforming technique.
We derived the secrecy outage probability and demonstrated that
the probability of receiving the right encoded information by
an untrustworthy relay is inversely proportional to the number
of sectors. We also showed that the aggressive behavior of the
cooperating untrusted relays is not effective compared to the case
where each untrusted relay is trying to intercept the transmitted
message individually.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secrecy outage probabil-
ity, amplify and forward, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN wireless networks, nodes can join and leave frequently,which increases the risk of the malicious nodes that are
penetrating the wireless network. Therefore, the demand for
security solutions in the physical layer is becoming more and
more essential. One of the important metrics that evaluate the
security performance in the physical layer is the secrecy rate,
which is the difference between the channel capacity of the
legitimate links and the channel capacity of the illegitimate
ones [1]. Many techniques have been proposed to achieve
a positive secrecy rate, such as cooperative jamming, multi-
antenna scenarios, beamforming, game theory, and power
allocation schemes [2]. A wireless network could benefit from
the new joining nodes, by using them as relays, or by treating
them as potential eavesdroppers. However, as shown in [3],
taking advantage of these nodes and using them as relays
could be more useful to the wireless network, from a security
perspective, than treating them as eavesdroppers. The authors
in [4] studied the secrecy performance for the case of having
multiple passive untrusted relays, where each passive untrusted
relay is trying to intercept its received message individually.
In [5], the authors studied the secrecy capacity scaling with
aggressive untrusted relays. We define the aggressive behavior
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as when the untrusted relays are cooperating between each
other by sending their received messages to an external wire-
tapper. Both [4] and [5] considered two transmission schemes,
namely opportunistic relaying (OR) and distributed beamform-
ing (DBF). They also demonstrated that DBF outperforms OR
technique from a secrecy perspective. In [6], a new location-
based multicasting technique was proposed considering both
passive and aggressive untrusted relays behaviors. It was
shown that this technique enhances the security compared to
[4] and [5].
On the other hand, the randomness of the channel has
been exploited for different purposes, whether to enhance the
reliability or to secure the communication system as it was
used to generate keys in [7]. Therefore, in this paper, we
combine the channel randomness with multicasting transmis-
sion to propose a new location-based multicasting protocol
in two-hops wireless sensor networks (WSN). The goal of
this protocol is to increase the security of these networks
while taking into account that wireless sensor nodes have
limited capabilities. In the proposed protocol, the source and
the destination share the channel state information (CSI) to
map the source’s transmission by sending the useful encoded
message towards a specific sector, while sending other fake
messages, similar to the useful one, towards the other sectors
to confuse the eavesdroppers. We provide analytical expres-
sions for secrecy outage probability (SOP) for both passive
and aggressive untrusted relays. Our numerical results show
how our technique enhances the security performance and how
immune it is against the aggressive behavior of the untrusted
relays. Finally, adopting such a security protocol by allowing
a part of the nodes to forward fake messages is promising
because of the availability of high number of cheap electronic
sensors with limited computational capabilities.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a multi-antennas source s, K amplify-and-forward
(AF) cooperative relay sensor nodes with limited capabilities,
and a destination d. Out of the K relays, there are U
untrustworthy relays that could be potential eavesdroppers.
Each relay is equipped with a single antenna and works in
a half-duplex mode, as shown in Fig.1. It is assumed that
there is no direct link between s and d, i.e. all the transmitted
information should be forwarded by the relays. To perform
the proposed security method, s and d should share the CSI
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
07
34
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 F
eb
 20
19
ii
Fig. 1: In the 1st hop of each transmission, s multicasts the useful
message xtr and the fake ones xi 6=tr’s towards N sectors. In the 2nd
hop, the K relays retransmit their received messages towards d.
knowledge of the source-trusted relay-destination link, which
is the kernel of our developed security method. This CSI
is considered to be the main cause of randomness and it is
completely mapped into a vector V of digital values. It should
be noted that this security algorithm is implemented just before
the communication process starts, and it can be renewed at
any time s and d agree on to keep refreshing the source of
security and to make it as strong as possible. In the first hop,
the source will encode the data prior to the transmission by
using the vector V . Then, s will use this vector again to
map its transmission of different messages xi’s towards N
sectors, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , N ∈ N+. We will denote the
desired encoded signal by xtr, whereas the other signals xi 6=tr
are the fake ones that are transmitted over the other sectors.
Without the knowledge of V , each untrusted relay e will try to
randomly guess the useful signal with a probability 1/N . Even
if it succeeds in guessing and receiving the useful message,
the untrusted relay would still need the vector V to decode
it. In the second phase, all the K relays will resend their
received messages towards d using DBF technique. Since it
has the same vector V , the destination will be able to know
from which sector the useful message is coming and decode it
using V . The received signal expression, at a kth relay, where
1 ≤ k ≤ K, is given by
yk =
√
Pi hs,k xi +nk, (1)
where nk ∼ Nc
(
0, σ2
)
is the complex additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the kth relay, with mean 0 and variance σ2,
Pi is the transmitted power from s towards the ith sector. We
assumed that the channels are quasi-static block log-normal
channels, i.e. the channel coefficient hv,r ∼ lnN (µv, σ2v),
where {v, r} ⊂ {{s, k}, {k, d}}, is considered as constant
during the transmission time of one message, but it may
change independently thereafter, the CSI is known by the
receiving nodes, and the noise variance N0 has the same value
in the first and the second phases. It is important to note that
adopting such security solution by allowing a part of the nodes
to forward fake messages is feasible due to the availability of
a high number of electronic sensors with limited capabilities.
Consequently, the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), at a
kth relay, is expressed as
γk = ρs |hs,k|2, (2)
where ρj
∆
=Pj/N0, j ∈ {s, k, e}. In the second hop, the re-
transmitted message from the kth relay will be χk = αk wk yk,
where wk is the beamforming weight, and αk represents the
normalized amplifying coefficient αk = 1√
ρs |hs,k|2 +N0 . The
received useful messages at d will be written as
yd =
∑M
m=1
hm,d αm wm ym + nd, (3)
where M is the number of the relays in the sector that
receives the right message. 1 ≤ m ≤ M , nd ∼ Nc (0, N0) is
the complex AWGN at d. After optimizing the beamforming
weights from [4] and the references therein, the SNR at the
destination is obtained as
γd =
∑M
m=1
ρs |hs,m|2 ρm |hm,d|2
ρs |hs,m|2 + ρm |hm,d|2 +1
=
∑M
m=1
γm. (4)
The channel capacity at d will be
Cd =
[
1
2
log (1 + γd)
]+
, (5)
where [ξ ]+ denotes max{ξ, 0}.
A. Non colluding eavesdropping relays
In this scenario, there are two different hypotheses H1 and
H2 as follows :
Hypothesis H1: the untrusted relay is in the right sector with
a probability p1 = 1/N and it knows how to recover V and
decode the message.
Hypothesis H2: the untrusted relay is in a wrong sector, with
a probability p0 = 1 − p1 = 1− 1/N . Then, this relay
will not impact the security and the channel capacity at the
eavesdropper e will be equivalent to zero from a security point
of view. Considering the aforementioned two hypotheses, the
channel capacity at e will be expressed as
Ce =
{
1
2 log (1 + γe) H1
0 H2,
(6)
where γe = ρs |hs,e|2 is the SNR of the useful message at e.
B. colluding eavesdropping relays
Assuming aggressive untrusted relays, cooperating between
each other and sending their messages towards an external
wire-tapper A, the received useful signal at A will be written
as
yA =
∑U1
u=1
hu,A αu wu yu + nA, (7)
where U1 is the number of the untrusted relays that are in the
right sector and sending the useful messages xtr, and 1 ≤ u ≤
U1 ≤ U . Moreover, nA ∼ Nc (0, N0) is the complex AWGN
at A. Hence, the SNR at A will become
γA =
∑U1
u=1
ρs |hs,u|2 ρu |hu,A|2
ρs |hs,u|2+ρu |hu,A|2+1
=
∑U1
u=1
γu. (8)
We will define two hypotheses for A:
Hypothesis H
′
1: A receives the right message with a probabil-
ity p1 = 1/N and knows how to recover V and decodes the
message.
iii
Hypothesis H
′
2: the colluding relays are just in the wrong
sectors, or A con not recover V , which means that A won’t
have any impact on the security. Hence, the channel capacity
at A will be equivalent to
CA =
{
1
2 log (1 + γA) H
′
1
0 H
′
2,
(9)
We will define the worst security case as when e, (in the non
colluding state), or A, (in the colluding state), knows how to
recover V and decode the message. Therefore, the channel
capacity at q, where q ∈ {e,A}, is given as
Cq =
[
1
N
.
1
2
log (1 + γq)
]+
. (10)
From (5) and (10), the general secrecy capacity expression of
the worst case is calculated as
CS,q =[Cd − Cq]+=
[
1
2
log (1+γd)− 1
2N
log (1+γq)
]+
. (11)
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability expression of
our proposed method CS,q , for both passive and aggressive
untrusted relays scenarios, is expressed as
Pr [CS,q < R] =
2
3
Φ
((
ln
(
22R
(
1 + e
µq
) 1
N −1
)
− µd
)
σ−1d
)
+
1
6
Φ
((
ln
(
22R
(
1 + e(
µq +
√
3σq)
) 1
N −1
)
− µd
)
σ−1d
)
−1
6
Φ
((
ln
(
22R
(
1 + e(
µq −
√
3σq)
) 1
N −1
)
−µd
)
σ−1d
)
. (12)
Proof: From (11), and for a threshold R, the SOP is
defined as [4]
Pr [CS,q <R] = Pr
[
1
2
log(1+γd)− 1
2N
log(1+γq)<R
]
(13)
= Pr
[
γd < 2
2R (1 + γq)
1
N −1
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Fγd
(
22R (1 + γq)
1
N −1
)
fγq (γq) d γq.
Since γq and γd are following a log-normal distribution,
(please refer to Appendix A for the proof), then their probabil-
ity density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function
(CDF) are given as follows
fX(x;µ, σ) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
e−
(ln x−µ)2
2σ2 , (14)
FX(x;µ, σ) = Φ
(
lnx− µ
σ
)
, (15)
and Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Thus,
the SOP in (13) is obtained as
Pr [CS,q < R] = (16)
=
∞∫
0
Φ
 ln
(
22R (1 + γq)
1
N −1
)
− µd
σd
 e− (ln γq −µq)22 σq2
γq σq
√
2pi
d γq.
Let β = ln (γq) , then γq = eβ , and d γq = eβ dβ. (17)
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Fig. 2: SOP with passive untrusted relays: R = 3 bps/Hz, M = 4,
σs = σk = 0.95 and µs = µk = 1.
β is a normally distributed r.v. β ∼ N (µq, σ2q ). Substituting
(17) in (16), the secrecy outage probability Pr [CS,q < R] is
written as
∞∫
0
ψ(β)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Φ
 ln
(
22R
(
1 + eβ
) 1
N −1
)
− µd
σd
 e− (β−µq)22 σq2
σq
√
2pi
dβ. (18)
It is noticed that (18) denotes the expectation of ψ (β). We
will use Holtzman tool [8] to approximate E [ψ (β)] in terms
of three points located at µq , µq +
√
3σq and µq −
√
3σq as
follows
Pr [CS,q < R] = E [ψ (β)] =
2
3
ψ (µq) +
1
6
ψ
(
µq +
√
3σq
)
− 1
6
ψ
(
µq −
√
3σq
)
. (19)
Compensating ψ (β) from (18) in (19) yields (12).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the validity of our derived
results using MATLAB software. Fig.2 shows the SOP as a
function of the SNR. It is noticed that the derived expressions
accurately characterize the simulation results. It is assumed
that R = 3 bps/Hz, M = 4, σs = σk = 0.95 and
µs = µk = 1. From Fig.2, we can see how the secrecy
performance improves when the number of sectors N is
increased. For example, to keep the SOP level at 10−2, the
source has to increase the number of sectors N from 4 to 8,
which will also reduces the required SNR from 23dB to 17dB.
Also, it is shown that our performed technique outperforms the
conventional jamming technique, where the destination jams
the nodes while the source is transmitting in the first hop. As
we can see from Fig.2, the margin between the worst and the
best case, when e does not know how to recover V , depends
on e’s capability in recovering V and decoding the message.
Fig.3 shows the SOP of our proposed technique for different
values of N , when R = 2 bps/Hz, σs = σk = 1.1, and
iv
0 5 10 15 2010
−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Eb/N0 [dB]
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
Sim, N=2, U1=3
Theory, N=2, U1=3
Sim, N=4, U1=3
Theory, N=4, U1=3
Sim, N=8, U1=3
Theory, N=8, U1=3
Sim, N=4, U1=1
Theory, N=4, U1=1
Sim, Jamming Tech, U1=3
Fig. 3: SOP with aggressive untrusted relays: R = 2 bps/Hz, M = 4,
σs = σk = 1.1 and µs = µk = 0.69.
µs = µk = 0.69. It can be seen that the greater the number
of sectors, the better the secrecy performance. Moreover, we
can see from Fig.3 that there is not that much of difference
between the base of one and that of three aggressive untrusted
relays. For example, at SNR level of 18dB, the SOP just
goes from 1.05× 10−2 to 1.85× 10−2 after adding two extra
aggressive untrusted relays, which means that our proposed
technique is immune towards adding more eavesdropping
relays that are cooperating with each other. Also, it is shown
that the security performance is improved when our technique
is applied compared to the jamming technique.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new location-based multicas-
ting protocol that is mapped by the knowledge of a trusted
link’s CSI in two-hops WSN. We provided an analytical study
for the SOP for the passive and the aggressive behaviors of
the untrusted relays. The results showed the immunity of our
technique towards the untrusted relays aggressive behavior,
and an improvement in the security compared to the conven-
tional jamming technique.
APPENDIX A
We will prove that γq and γd are following a log-normal
distribution. First, we will define the SNR γi,j as follows
γi,j = ρi |hi,j |2, (20)
where i ∈ {s,m} and j ∈ {m, e, d}.
Lemma 1. Let X ∼ lnN (µ, σ2), then aX ∼ lnN (µ +
ln a, σ2), and Xa ∼ lnN (aµ, a2 σ2), a ∈ R.
From Lemma 1, where a = 2, the channel gain |hi,j |2 ∼
lnN (2µγi,j , 4σ2γi,j ). By using the properties in Lemma 1,
we find that γi,j ∼ lnN (µγi,j , σ2γi,j ), where µγi,j =
2µi + ln (ρi), ln (ρi) = ln (Pi) − ln (N0), and σ2γi,j = 4σi2.
Hence, γe ∼ lnN (µγs,e , σ2γs,e).
Now, we will find the distribution of γm (4) with the
following approximation for high SNRs, as follows
γm=
γs,m γm,d
γs,m+γm,d+1
≈ γs,m γm,d
γs,m+γm,d
=
1
1
γs,m
+ 1γm,d
=
1
z
, (21)
where z = z1 + z2, z1 = 1γs,m and z2 =
1
γm,d
.
Lemma 2. Let Xj ∼ lnN (µj , σ2j ) are independent log-
normally distributed variables with varying σ and µ param-
eters, and Y =
∑n
j=1Xj . Then the distribution of Y has no
closed form expression, but can be reasonably approximated
by another log-normal distribution Z with parameters [9]
µZ = ln
[∑
eµj+σ
2
j/2
]
− σ2Z2 , (22)
σ2Z = ln
[∑
e
2µj+σ
2
j (e
σ2j−1)
(
∑
e
µj+σ
2
j
/2
)2
+ 1
]
. (23)
Form Lemma 1, where a = −1, we find that Z1 ∼
lnN (−µγs,m , σ2γs,m) and Z2 ∼ lnN (−µγm,d , σ2γm,d). Also,
from Lemma 2, Z ∼ lnN (µz, σ2z), where
σz
2 = ln
((
exp
(
σ2z1
)− 1) /2 + 1) ,
µz = ln (2 exp (µz1)) + 0.5
(
σ2z1 −σ2z
)
.
Thus, from Lemma 1 and (21), we get γm ∼ lnN (µγm , σ2γm),
where a = −1, µγm = −µz , and σ2γm = σ2z . From (4), since
γd is a sum of many γm, we will again use Lemma 2 to find
that γd ∼ lnN (µγd , σ2γd), where
σd
2 = ln
((
exp
(
σ2γm
)− 1) /M + 1) ,
µd = ln (M exp (µγm)) + 0.5
(
σ2γm −σ2d
)
.
Since the expressions of γu and γA in (8) are similar to γm
and γd respectively, by following the same steps, we show that
γu ∼ lnN (µγm , σ2γm) and γA ∼ lnN (µγA , σ2γA) where
σA
2 = ln
((
exp
(
σ2γm
)− 1) /U1 + 1) ,
µA = ln (U1 exp (µγm)) + 0.5
(
σ2γm −σ2A
)
.
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